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BELLE R. AND JOSEPH H. BRAUN
MEMORIAL LECTURE SERIES
FOREWORD: THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS
UNITED
STEVEN D. SCHWINN*

I am pleased to introduce the Articles that grew out of the
Belle R. and Joseph H. Braun Memorial Lecture Series and the
2011 John Marshall Law Review Symposium, The Impact of
Citizens United: Corporate Speech in the 2010 Elections. These
materials are as exciting and diverse as the Symposium itself and
promise to contribute significantly to the ongoing public debates
over the appropriate role of money in politics and the nature of
corporate speech rights.
The impressive array of Articles was no accident. We knew
from the start that we wanted this Symposium to be different and
to yield Articles that would inform policymakers, academics, and
even the public about the actual effects of Citizens United.' Thus,
we knew that we wanted to include policy analysts, practitioners
and activists, and academics from beyond the law school, in
addition to more traditional law professors. We knew that we
wanted to examine and critique the decision's actual effects in an
actual election, in addition to exploring the more traditional
theoretical aspects of the First Amendment and campaign finance
law. And we knew that we wanted to evaluate real policy options
in the context of real politics, in addition to discussing more
abstract proposals that are the more usual fare of academic
symposiums. We knew that we wanted to do all this with an
ideologically diverse and lively group.
Thus, we invited two of the top campaign finance lawyers in

* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. I would like
to thank the staff of the John Marshall Law Review for their tireless efforts on
the Symposium and these Articles. In particular, I would like to thank Patrick
Goodwin, Katie Simpson-Jones, and Kristen Zaharski for their leadership,
their outstanding work in helping to organize the Symposium, and their
efforts in editing and publishing this volume. I would also like to thank the
administration and staff at the John Marshall Law School, whose support
made this Symposium a success. Finally, of course, I would like to thank the
Braun family for its continued support of this lecture series.
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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the country: Marc E. Elias of Perkins Coie, and Benjamin L.
Ginsberg of Patton Boggs. We invited three of the top public policy
advocates: Ilya Shapiro of the Cato Institute, David Gans from the
Constitutional Accountability Center, and Monica Youn from the
Brennan Center for Justice. We invited four academics doing some
of the most interesting work on the issues: Geoffrey Stone and M.
Todd Henderson of the University of Chicago School of Law, Dr.
Peter Francia of East Carolina University, and Atiba Ellis of the
West Virginia University College of Law. And we invited one of
the most respected public voices on Congress, national politics,
and campaign finance to deliver our keynote address: Thomas
Mann of the Brookings Institution.
In addition to our panelists, we also invited our own faculty
experts to moderate our panels. Thus, we invited Professor Walter
Kendall and Professor William Ford to moderate a panel, and we
invited Professor Ann Lousin to introduce our keynote speaker,
Thomas Mann.
We were thrilled that these impressive invitees all accepted;
we thank them all for helping to ensure that our Symposium
exceeded even our own very high expectations. And we are thrilled
to publish their Articles that grew out of the Symposium in this
special volume of the Law Review.
Our issue begins with the keynote address by Thomas Mann,
the W. Averell Harriman Chair and Senior Fellow at the
Brookings Institution. Mann boldly and honestly sets Citizens
United2 in the broader national political context, where increasing
partisanship and a long move toward deregulation set the stage
for the ruling.
Mann first explores the impacts of the case on the 2010
elections. He concludes that it did not contribute to significantly
increased independent expenditures by major corporations; in fact,
increased independent expenditures were a minor factor in the
2010 elections. He also concludes that the case did not contribute
to the sharp decline in spending disclosure in 2010; instead,
several other factors-the move away from 527 organizations to
501(c) organizations, the rise of super PACs-drove this welldocumented phenomenon.
Mann next examines the policy responses to the ruling. He
argues that in this hyper-partisan political environment, Congress
is unlikely to pass any reforms. He says that any real policy
developments will occur in the judiciary, not Congress, and that
they will likely lead only to further deregulation. He explains that
the latest cases now seek to chip away at disclosure requirements,
and some litigation seeks even to take on the time-tested
distinction between expenditures and contributions so central to
2. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
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the path-breaking case, Buckley v. Valeo.3
Finally, Mann argues that we have reached the limit of
campaign finance regulation. He says that the most promising
area of campaign finance policy involves public matches for small
donations. This would create an incentive for candidates to chase
small donations and thus re-engage individual citizens in the
political process.
Professor Peter Francia picks up on some of Mann's
arguments about the effects of Citizens United on the 2010
elections. Francia contributed a piece that critically examines four
key predictions about campaign spending and influence in politics
in the wake of Citizens United. Francia thus looks at the case and
its effects on the 2010 mid-term election with a political scientist's
eye. He concludes-tentatively, based on data from just one
election-that some of the principal predictions about the effects of
Citizens United came true, others came true only slightly, and one
did not materialize at all. Moreover, Francia acknowledges that
other factors may have impacted spending and influence in the
2010 elections, further complicating the picture in this first postCitizens United national election.
Francia first looks at whether interest group spending
increased in the 2010 election. He concludes that there was a
sharp increase in interest group spending over spending in 2006,
the last mid-term election, and even over spending in 2008, a
presidential year. Moreover, independent expenditures rose
relative to electioneering communication, suggesting that interest
groups were channeling their expenditures in reaction to Supreme
Court rulings.
Francia next examines whether corporate and pro-business
messages drowned out the voices of their traditional political
opponents. He finds that pro-business spending indeed increased
in the 2010 election. But he also finds that organized labor groups
spent a competitive amount and thus also played a significant role.
He concludes that pro-business interests did not drown out the
voices of organized labor, at least not to the extent predicted by
critics of Citizens United.
Third, Francia examines whether Citizens United gave
Republicans an advantage over Democrats. He explains that
spending by conservative and pro-business groups increased
dramatically in 2010, that spending by conservative groups
exceeded spending by liberal groups, and that this reversed a
trend going back to the 1996 election. But he concludes that some
of the conservative gains may be attributable to other features of
the 2010 election and not just Citizens United.
Finally, Francia looks at the influence of foreign corporations
3. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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in the 2010 election. He notes that Citizens United did not address
the prohibition on contributions by foreign nationals, but that
critics worried that corporations-any corporations-would find a
way to spend money in U.S. elections. Francia concludes that there
is no evidence of increased influence by foreign corporations in the
2010 election.
Monica Youn moves the discussion from effects of the decision
to a policy reaction to the decision. Youn, of the Brennan Center
for Justice at New York University School of Law, contributed her
testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil
Rights and Human Rights of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
on The Fair Elections Now Act. That Act, which would establish a
public financing program for federal congressional candidates that
would match funds for small campaign contributors, was one of
the many congressional responses to Citizens United. Youn argues
that the Act would plug some of the gaping holes left in federal
campaign finance law by Citizens United.
Youn starts by showing how Citizens United opened the door
for a flood of corporate spending in the 2010 elections. Spending by
corporations and wealthy special interests skyrocketed in the midterm elections, and it is only projected to increase in the 2012
presidential cycle. Youn explains how federal reporting
requirements allow corporations to shield their expenditures from
public disclosure by funneling contributions through trade
associations, nonprofits, and "super PACs"-a new vehicle,
spawned by Citizens United and its progeny, that facilitates
massive and anonymous coordinated corporate campaign
spending. As a result, corporations can hide their political
involvement from both the public and their own shareholders.
This, in turn, increases the potential for actual political corruption
and the appearance of corruption, and it curbs the relative
political influence and involvement of ordinary citizens. In short,
Citizens United, by encouraging massive and secretive corporate
spending, helps to put the political levers in the hands of
anonymous corporations while at the same time disenchanting and
disenfranchising exactly those natural people who ought to control
our politics.
Youn argues that the Act offers an important fix to some of
these problems, which Citizens United helped create. Drawing on
case studies from public financing programs in the states, she
argues that public financing works to reduce actual and perceived
political corruption; that it allows public officials to focus on policy,
not fundraising; and that it increases political participation by
grassroots organizations and ordinary citizens. By matching small
donations, the Act would only magnify these effects.
Finally, Youn points out that public financing programs are
still constitutionally viable, even under Citizens United. While
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that is true, the Supreme Court suggested just this past Termafter our Symposium and after Youn delivered her testimonythat it would hold Congress and state legislatures on a very tight
leash when they deviate from a standard block-grant or matchingfunds program. The Court in Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett
ruled that Arizona's public financing program, which provided for
matching funds for participating candidates when their
nonparticipating opponents outspent them, violated the First
Amendment. 4 The Court wrote that a basic, block-grant public
financing program remained constitutional, but the Court's
reasoning suggests that even the basic program may be hanging
on by a string.5
David Gans and Douglas Kendall of the Constitutional
Accountability Center contributed a piece on the history of
corporate personhood, A Capitalist Joker: The Strange Origins,
DisturbingPast, and Uncertain Futureof CorporatePersonhood in
American Law. Carefully reviewing the constitutional text,
history, and jurisprudence, Gans and Kendall argue that the
Constitution supports neither corporate personhood nor corporate
rights-that, indeed, these ideas arose from an historical
irregularity in the late nineteenth century, not anything like the
Framers' understanding or the Court's dominant jurisprudence.
The idea of corporate First Amendment rights, then, flies in the
face of our constitutional traditions.
Gans and Kendall start with the Founding and argue that the
Framers had no idea that corporations would have personhood or
rights under our Constitution. For the Framers, corporations were
artificial entities possessing certain privileges and protections only
to enable them to succeed as economic actors; they were not people
with fundamental or inalienable rights. This understanding is
reflected in the text of the original Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, both of which speak in terms of the rights of people, not
entities. Moreover, the Framers assumed that corporations could
be, even must be, comprehensively regulated in the broader
interest of the public welfare.
Gans and Kendall next trace the Court's treatment of
corporations, starting in the early Republic, and show how the
Court's early treatment of corporations is consistent with the
Framers' understanding and the text. They explain that the Court
consistently rejected corporate citizenship in the early nineteenth
century and that it treated corporations as perfectly legitimate
objects of government regulation (and not as rights-bearing
persons). Later, the Fourteenth Amendment, with its Citizenship

4. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011).

5. Id.
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Clause that defines citizenship in terms of birth or naturalization,
things that only a live person can do, only served to underscore the
Court's earlier rejection of corporate personhood.
Against this history, Justice Field in 1882 planted the seed
for corporate personhood and corporate rights. Justice Field was
riding circuit that year in the Railroad Tax Cases6 and wrote a
lengthy opinion that a corporation was a person under the
Constitution and that the tax violated its right to equal protection.
When a companion case came before the Supreme Court, the court
reporter slipped in his description of oral argument that the
justices all agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to
corporations. The Court itself, however, never reached the
question in its opinion. Thus, a court reporter's description of oral
argument introduced this Capitalist Joker against nearly a
century of contrary understanding and jurisprudence.
Gans and Kendall explain that the Court's approach
vacillated ever since. During the Lochner era, the Court ruled that
corporations were persons and enjoyed certain constitutional
rights. But from 1937 to 1971, the Court backtracked and rejected
nearly all of the corporate protections it recognized in the Lochner
era. 7 In 1971, Justice Powell reintroduced the idea of corporate
personhood and corporate rights. But in the most recent cases, the
Court again rejected corporate rights claims.
Gans and Kendall conclude by situating Citizens United
within this background and arguing that the case marks a return
to the Lochner era for corporate personhood.
Ilya Shapiro, Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies at the
Cato Institute, and Caitlyn McCarthy, Legal Associate at the Cato
Institute, take issue with Gans and Kendall's critique of corporate
personhood and corporate rights. Shapiro and McCarthy, in their
piece that distinguishes between individual rights and corporate
rights, attack the idea of corporate personhood: of course
corporations are not persons, they say, but that does not mean
that they do not enjoy certain rights under the Constitution, even
if those rights may be different than rights due individuals.
Shapiro and McCarthy first trace the evolution of corporate
personhood and corporate rights. They explain that critics of
corporate personhood predicted that corporations would enjoy the
same rights as individuals, but they argue that this never came
true. Instead, the Supreme Court ruled, as recently as 2011 in
FCC v. AT&Ts that while corporations enjoy some rights, those
rights are not equivalent to the rights of live human beings. Thus,
"corporate personhood"-the idea that corporations enjoy the same

6. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875).
7. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

8. FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).
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rights as human beings-is false. More accurately, corporations
are artificial entities that enjoy selected and appropriate rights,
but not the same rights due live human beings.
Shapiro and McCarthy next examine why corporations have
any rights. They offer four principal theories of corporate rights.
First, corporations are a useful vehicle for aggregations of
individuals to exercise their individual rights. As aggregations of
persons, corporations must also have the rights of those persons.
Next, corporations are merely legal shells for their owners'
exercise of activities to promote the corporation. Many of these
activities (like corporate advertising, for example) involve
fundamental rights (like free speech) and, therefore, corporations
must have certain rights. Third, corporations must enjoy certain
rights in order for those rights to retain their vitality in our
democracy. If government can trammel corporate rights, it can
also trammel individual rights. Fourth, government cannot trade
corporate rights for a government-issued charter or license; this
violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Moreover,
corporations arise principally from a web of private contracts, not
government-issued licenses, and government cannot infringe on
the rights of those individual parties to the contracts.
Finally, Shapiro and McCarthy argue that particular kinds of
corporations-media corporations, advocacy corporations, and the
like-surely must, and quite clearly do, enjoy free speech rights.
This bedrock principal would erode if corporations were
categorically not entitled to rights.
Professor Atiba Ellis rounds out our Articles with a more
theoretical approach to corporate rights. Ellis wrote an Article
situating Citizens United and the idea of corporate personhood in
the larger context of historical and evolving ideas of political
personhood in our Republic. While so much of the literature on
Citizens United addresses the question whether the Court was
right to grant corporate personhood and corporate rights under the
First Amendment, Ellis turns this question on its head and
examines what corporate personhood means as only the latest step
in a long evolution of the idea of political personhood. Ellis thus
takes a sharp turn, running at a crosscurrent with much of the
literature, and opens up a fascinating line of inquiry: Compared to
the evolution of political personhood for African Americans and
women, what does Citizens United say about the nature of political
personhood, citizenship, and rights?
Ellis begins by examining the process of extending political
personhood, with particular reference to African Americans and
women. He argues that in extending political personhood, the
Supreme Court has used a two-step process. First, the Court has
made a specific choice to examine political personhood and to
define it for whatever purpose was at issue. Next, the Court has

The John Marshall Law Review

[44:xxiii

asked whether the claimant fits the definition. As the Court slowly
moved to extend political personhood to African Americans and
women-piecemeal, and over time-it created tiers of personhood
by selectively extending only components of political personhood to
African Americans and women. At the same time, the evolution
reinforced the privilege of the dominant form of social
construction, white male supremacy. As a result, African
Americans and women achieved only a kind of second-tier political
personhood.
In contrast to the step-by-step extension of political
citizenship to African Americans and women, Citizens United
extended full political personhood to corporations in one fell swoop.
The case suddenly thrust upon corporations a core privilege of
political personhood-the First Amendment right to engage in
campaign speech-raising a host of questions about the nature
and hierarchy of political personhood. Ellis argues that because of
mass corporate wealth Citizens United privileges corporations over
citizens, creating a new kind of tiered political personhood, with
corporations on top. Moreover, because corporations themselves
are dominated by white male privilege, Citizens United replicates
and perpetuates patterns of white male privilege in our existing
tiers of political personhood.
Thus, the following Articles reflect exactly what we sought to
achieve in our Symposium: a diverse, lively, multi-disciplinary
examination of Citizens United and its effects on the 2010 elections
and beyond. We hope you enjoy reading them as much as we
enjoyed publishing them.

